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Abstract
This study investigates the pay-performance relation for directors and managers in a sample of Thai public
companies. It is hypothesized that family ownership mediates the pay-performance relations for directors
and managers. The results show a strong link between managerial compensation and firm performance
only for firms with low levels of family ownership. Conversely, there is a strong link between director
compensation and firm performance only for firms with high levels of family ownership. The findings
indicate that the relation between executive compensation and firm performance is more complex than
previously documented.
Keywords: corporate governance, executive compensation, firm performance, family ownership

1 Introduction
Compensation contracts are utilized as a means of aligning the interests of agents (managers)
with those of principals (owners) and can be designed to provide incentives aligning the
behavior of managers to act on behalf of the shareholders.1 For large Western economies,
studies typically find a positive relation between executive compensation and firm
performance.2 However, it may be problematic to rely on empirical studies based on the US
experience to make policy inferences in other countries.

Most nations have ownership

structures which have dramatically higher levels of ownership concentration compared to US
firms.3,4 In addition, shares of firms with concentrated ownership are frequently held by one
or more families, where family shareholders often hold management positions.
In the case of these family firms, it is argued that the primary agency conflict is no longer
between the managers and a wide base of outside shareholders.5 In fact, the primary agency
conflict is between the controlling shareholder and minority or outside shareholders. Thus, a
central question is whether compensation contracts are designed to mitigate this type of
agency conflict. Previous studies on executive compensation have largely ignored the fact
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that compensation for managers and directors should therefore be examined simultaneously.
Implicitly, these prior studies assume that managers and directors undertake the same
decision-making roles. It is argued that the relation between pay and performance is much
more complicated that previously assumed in the literature. Specifically, variations in
ownership structure can lead to differences in agency conflicts. Furthermore, the roles of
managers and directors may also vary according to the ownership structure.

2. Literature review
Ownership structure within a country is often a consequence of history and the resulting
economic system and legal environment.6 For example, in emerging market economies, the
presence of high ownership concentrations is shown to be a response to the lack of legal
protection for shareholders.4 The founding family often holds a high ownership stake as a
means of solving imperfections in corporate governance mechanisms and to provide an
avenue for effective monitoring of managers.7

Therefore, it is common that most top

executives of family controlled companies tend to come from the controlling family.3 Theory
suggests that linking executive compensation to firm performance can mitigate agency
problems by aligning managerial incentives with those of the owners.1 For Asian countries,
previous studies demonstrate a positive relation between executive compensation and firm
performance.8,9 However, other studies find no relation between executive pay and firm
performance.10,11 These inconsistent results can be explained by the fact that previous studies
did not account for the effect of family influences on the pay-performance relations. In the
Philippines, for example, the relation between managerial pay and performance only exists for
firms not affiliated with a family group.12
Like those in emerging markets in Asia, many listed companies in Thailand have a high
concentration of family ownership.3 In addition, it is common for the top executives of
family firms in Thailand to be family members themselves.13 As a result, many corporate
governance mechanisms designed to monitor the top managers may be less important for
family firms in Thailand.14 To attract outside investor, board independence and monitoring
may also be viable solutions, especially in those cases where the founder is not actively
running the firm.13

3. Hypotheses
It is hypothesized that ownership structure, particularly the presence of family ownership,
determines which agency problem dominates and whether tying manager pay or board pay to
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performance best mitigates the dominant agency problem. Much like firms in the US, Thai
firms with more diffuse ownership structures may be prone to owner-manager agency
conflicts that may best be alleviated by tying managers pay to performance. In contrast, Thai
firms with concentrated family ownership may be more likely prone to minority-majority
owner agency conflicts that are best alleviated by tying board pay to performance. Significant
minority owners, unrelated to the founding family, can have the latent ability to constrain the
self-serving behavior of majority family shareholders. In addition, many family firms are
willing to submit to some level of minority shareholder monitoring in order to attract outside
funds and to build business alliances. Therefore, it is argued that one way to diminish the
adverse effects of the manager-owner agency conflict, which is more likely to occur in a nonfamily firm with a diffuse base of owners, is to tie manager compensation to firm
performance.
Hypothesis 1a. The relation between manager pay and performance is stronger for nonfamily firms than family firms.
In contrast, a way to diminish the majority owner-minority owner agency conflict, which may
be more likely occur in a family firm, is to tie board compensation to performance.
Hypothesis 1b. The relation between board pay and performance is stronger for family firms
than non-family firms.

4. Data and methodology
The sample consists of 218 non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET). Ownership information is gathered from the SETSMART database, which provides a
list of the top ten shareholders for each firm. In addition, annual reports and annual
regulatory filings (e.g. Form 56-1) are used to trace share ownership. Share ownership is
categorized as family ownership for all family-controlled shares, including shareholders with
the same surname and known familial relationships (relatives, spouses, children, etc.), even if
the last names are different. Descriptive statistics for firm specific variables are presented in
Table 1. Family ownership, defined as the number of shares owned by family members
divided by the total number of shares outstanding, averages 36.5 percent across the sample
indicating the high ownership concentration in Thailand. The dependent variables in the
regression models are director compensation and manager compensation. Return on assets
(ROA) is employed as the measure of firm performance. Corporate governance variables
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included in the analysis are the percentage of family ownership, CEO duality, CEO/founder
dummy, Board Chair/founder dummy, board size, and board independence. Firm-specific
variables include firm size, growth, leverage, and risk.
Table 1 - This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 218 public firms in Thailand.
Variable
Mean
Median
Minimum Maximum
Family Ownership
0.37
0.40
0.00
0.91
Board Size
11.88
11.00
3.00
29.00
Board Independence
0.34
0.33
0.14
0.73
Average Director Pay (mil. Baht)
0.54
0.31
0.01
6.41
Average Manager Pay (mil. Baht)
3.16
2.30
1.20
14.34
Return on Assets (ROA)
0.06
0.05
-0.19
0.32
Firm Size (Logarithm of Total Assets)
15.11
14.97
11.90
20.29
Growth (3-year Asset Growth)
0.48
0.29
-0.72
4.48
Leverage (Debt/Total Assets)
0.26
0.24
0.00
0.88
Risk (Standard Deviation of Returns)
0.82
0.54
0.02
6.12

SD
0.26
4.46
0.11
0.70
2.58
0.08
1.42
0.77
0.20
0.92

5. Empirical results
Table 2 reports regression results with director compensation and management compensation
as the dependent variables. The sample is classified into two groups based on the proportion
of family ownership. The results of the models demonstrate that the pay-performance relation
differs between high family-concentrated and low family-concentrated firms. Specifically,
there is a positive relation between director pay and performance among high family
ownership firms, whereas the positive relation between manager pay and performance holds
only for low family ownership firms. In high family ownership firms, managers appear to be
effectively monitored by family owners or are themselves members of the family. Therefore,
it may not be beneficial to tie manager pay to firm performance. However, in these high
family ownership firms, the monitoring role of the board may become correspondingly more
important. This is consistent with our findings and the idea that conflicts between majority
family owners and minority owners are more easily resolved at the board level. In low family
ownership firms, managers are more likely to be outside professionals and may have greater
decision-making responsibilities. As evidence, manager pay is found to be positively related
to performance for low family ownership firms. These findings suggest that directors are the
key decision-makers in family firms, whereas managers are the key decision-makers for the
more widely-held, low family ownership firms. The empirical results provide support to the
notion that in non-family firms, the overriding governance conflict is between the managers
and a diffuse base of owners. The results also highlight to roles of board of directors for high
family ownership firms.
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Table 2 - Regression Results between Executive Compensation and Firm Performance
Director Compensation
Manager Compensation
Low
High
Low
High
Return on Assets (ROA)
0.191
3.699*
3.310*
0.082
(0.15)
(3.29)
(4.00)
(0.12)
Family Ownership
0.059
-0.442
0.557
0.047
(0.09)
(-0.57)
(1.35)
(0.10)
CEO Duality
0.020
-0.204
-0.313
0.156
(0.06)
(-0.75)
(-1.50)
(0.97)
Board Size
-0.011
0.220
-0.340
0.049
(-0.04)
(0.92)
(-1.90)
(0.35)
Board Independence
-0.337
0.077
-0.173
0.226
(-1.03)
(0.25)
(-0.81)
(1.23)
Firm Size
0.419*
0.548*
0.281*
0.426*
(5.82)
(7.38)
(6.03)
(9.72)
Growth
-0.032
0.250
-0.210*
0.105
(-0.28)
(1.56)
(-2.88)
(1.11)
Leverage
-0.163
-0.882
0.246
-0.436
(-0.31)
(-1.80)
(0.73)
(-1.51)
Risk
0.008
-0.054
-0.030
-0.033
(0.08)
(-0.46)
(-0.49)
(-0.47)
Intercept
5.972*
4.155*
10.904*
8.477*
(4.85)
(3.41)
(13.67)
(11.75)
Adj. R-squared
0.251
0.456
0.447
0.482
F-statistics
5.02*
11.04*
10.72*
12.15*
N
109
109
109
109
* p < 0.05

6. Conclusions
The findings from this study highlight potential problems with generalizing empirical
relations for director pay-performance or manager pay-performance. The results show that,
under different ownership structures, the relations observed for director pay-performance are
in sharp contrast to the relations uncovered for manager pay-performance.

Given the

relatively weak legal environment present in Thailand, it is not surprising to find evidence
that the relation between pay and performance is affected by the firm’s ownership structure.
To date, nearly all previous pay-performance studies of firms in economies around the world
have investigated only director pay or manager pay, but not both. In Thailand, the results also
show that the pay-performance relations are mediate by the firms’ ownership structure. These
findings highlight the complex and dynamic nature of corporate governance in emerging
markets.

The interrelation between ownership structure and other corporate governance

mechanisms are important considerations in the study of the roles of directors and managers.
Finally, Asian regulators should emphasize the importance of disclosing the compensation of
both managers and directors.
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